Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ee2624f9c759525d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

190.5 KB Created: 2020-11-07 07:42:51 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: c645acf2dbe9379a1cd753059c3376bd SHA-1: 128a2e01d7a37e7c1f344a78f2180f4c2a633db4 SHA-256: ee2624f9c759525d403a79693fbe487b91ad8c42c88b4a2ff5ed6a8e6255e925
76 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains an embedded URL that leads to a resource, likely intended for a phishing or social engineering lure. The heuristic 'SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE' indicates that the document likely instructs the user to open a password-protected archive, a common tactic to bypass gateway security. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffset.ru/aws?keyword=5e+monster+manual+flip
    • https://lidovoji.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134313359/2097619.pdf
    • https://xukanimuwuvam.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132696198/simefaruw.pdf
    • https://tisatazufewuvo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131163687/boloduxi.pdf
    • https://mumixopid.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131872042/gajozokupezu.pdf
    • https://nowusunomotir.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134314498/6205642.pdf
    • https://jonipafatanepa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132741476/sinuwotiloselo.pdf
    • https://poroxokinawutaj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134507376/5930544.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/lorifumofelu/53438520494.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/66a8d7cb-863c-445e-a193-d5d1fa2ca724/71199686496.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/figugipopar/faberoniso.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/farezelof/nebujavivutovaw.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xoxaneral/application_for_bonafide_certificate_from_college_for_scholarship.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f7800195-177c-46f3-a78f-e535869c02a2/the_umbrella_academy_comic_descargar.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0002ac49.bin
13237ed3e736f26b0c32ad5c18659eb4c9421d7653b94fb28754544731a8cf39
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2AC49 5076 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0002bd74.bin
3e2f50d31a1793e94fb8ec2746abb0477885f722170748cc00b5da683a9181bd
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2BD74 14636 bytes