Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ee1bbd856bf72a79…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

273.9 KB Created: 2021-01-29 07:44:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 15.0000 First seen: 2022-04-28
MD5: d7888fea6047b662a30bf00edac4c3ee SHA-1: 8137670512be55796f612e41602f505955b0bb0c SHA-256: ee1bbd856bf72a79221baa0f7e97aafb6051129905d62d74a37ae7754fccc3db
104 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The OOXML document contains VBA macros, specifically a Document_Open macro, which is a common technique for executing malicious code upon opening. The script includes a Base64 decoding function, suggesting it is designed to deobfuscate and execute a payload. The presence of a 'Document_Open' macro and the Base64 decoding functionality strongly indicate that this document is intended to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
66dafe706716afcb77dee7567c04353fcc3e615e4952d96388f14d7a49da2aa0
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 3976 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 long base64-like blob(s).
vbaProject_00.bin
639b1aad484bd81ee6f96654e014bd990dc4177b69a1099b9d571c662f9d890e
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 14848 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 long base64-like blob(s).