IcedID — Office (OOXML) / .DOC malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ee103f8d64cd8fa8…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

34.0 KB Created: 2021-11-10 09:34:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: a9490d94cf547e27dcc0d52dc72e74e7 SHA-1: a00e440eb13f84c8b8faba5b81a7d85fce2a4074 SHA-256: ee103f8d64cd8fa884ff6a041db2f7aa403c502f54e26337c606044c2f205394
322 Risk Score

Malware Insights

IcedID · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing VBA macros. The 'document_open' macro triggers the execution of the 'main.karoline' subroutine. This subroutine retrieves a value from the document's keywords property, reverses it, and then uses WScript.Shell to execute 'c:\windows\explorer ' followed by the reversed string. This indicates a downloader functionality, consistent with the IcedID family. The use of Shell() and WScript.Shell are critical heuristic firings.

Heuristics 8

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.IcedID-8ff0f02ff0876072-9950256-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.IcedID-8ff0f02ff0876072-9950256-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
cbd00da6f83e30ec1377f7e19093c543634aa63f01e81ba6c633974a19bfcd70
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 969 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
647df13d43101abafb35742e5cdb0ceab3c140ea4c2235168debc16738c5f87d
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 15360 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.