Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 eddea1ca5aa1e2ae…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.43 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2022-12-06
MD5: f940a1e75287bd192c014aac8545cf92 SHA-1: b7cffb4fe204763a49df4873f67a9cc163e4cc89 SHA-256: eddea1ca5aa1e2ae6852ebb9de551b8368eb429d6e013f8ed47bb48ee7ce1f9b
148 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.005 PowerShell

The critical heuristic firing for CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE indicates the presence of a payload exploiting this specific vulnerability within the Equation Editor OLE object. The SC_GETPC_CALL heuristic further suggests code execution capabilities. While no VBA macros were found to contain executable statements, the embedded OLE object likely contains the exploit code. The primary attack vector is the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EDI) high SC_GETPC_CALL
    x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EDI)
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
1d3b71b8c6234aace88f31f6e674b07383e015a2e68993dcd4fc2526aa470fe5
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2412 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
37cfe152c8b1e837e0b70c63b385e7e279370f381bde83946a42bf10b57dbf47
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD00E57633/Ole10Native 1586 bytes