Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 edd9cf5527237b7f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

623.0 KB
MD5: 2e9243f17d9ff1833e19b160f6af50a1 SHA-1: d9f1a8fadbb2796b587eeb335be319b3cb87c268 SHA-256: edd9cf5527237b7fac1603fc246a6eddd7094678a0e9d60915d456ee8bfe9f07
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The OOXML document contains an altChunk that imports an external RTF file. This RTF file exhibits characteristics of OLE object embedding and activation, specifically using \objupdate to trigger OLE object execution. The presence of excessive hex data within the OLE object further suggests malicious intent, likely to download and execute a secondary payload. The document body itself does not provide specific lures, but the technical indicators point to a classic OLE-based attack vector.

Heuristics 6

  • altChunk imports embedded RTF (RTF injection) critical OOXML_ALTCHUNK_RTF
    Document inlines an embedded RTF via an aFChunk relationship and a <w:altChunk> body element. This is the canonical RTF-injection wrapper used to smuggle RTF exploits (Equation Editor / URL Moniker / objdata) past DOCX-only scanners. Word opens the wrapper and executes the RTF inline. Recursing into the RTF for the exact exploit primitive.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    (in altChunk RTF word/Kenya.rtf) RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    (in altChunk RTF word/Kenya.rtf) RTF contains ~2818KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    (in altChunk RTF word/Kenya.rtf) RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    (in altChunk RTF word/Kenya.rtf) RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://opendope.org/xpaths
    • http://opendope.org/conditions
    • http://opendope.org/questions
    • http://opendope.org/components
    • http://opendope.org/SmartArt/DataHierarchy
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/schemaLibrary/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/chart
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/chartDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/diagram
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/picture
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/spreadsheetDrawing
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2008/diagram
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliography
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/compatibility
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/lockedCanvas

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00003a12.bin
b5b2f2198ef41057338190a2c452be225c15ac0049164b205e990c25db262d4f		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3A12 1421653 bytes
objdata_01_off002c4d0f.bin
cfdb4a077c5f246e92e6322395cebc5a3dcf8a28c92ec8882aadb5231c9a8a69		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2C4D0F 584266 bytes

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