Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 eda301ea5f51da46…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

224.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-09-15
MD5: 413cea1a9f45536823254b21ea06b6ef SHA-1: 0cbbaee2d968b9eae700fcc0347d686ce2d50714 SHA-256: eda301ea5f51da4632028de04c78dbefc6e3f6710894dd2e05e37c23ceb2228a
114 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an Excel file that exploits CVE-2017-0199 via an OLE2Link object to download a payload from the URL https://mub.me/vzpv. The embedded VBA macros are minimal and do not appear to contain malicious logic themselves, but the primary heuristic indicates the exploitation of a known vulnerability for remote code execution. The sample also contains embedded PDF objects with suspicious static findings, suggesting a multi-stage attack.

Heuristics 6

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://mub.me/vzpv

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00000e00.pdf
7127528379b3ca176d277dbdad625bd47e124bf7a873a6e9d1a7e1e2c0de5c95		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE00 226304 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006000.pdf
1f616314443542a7a01e2e3f2b3e149396384d46011d41c227e7001c47962e2f		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6000 205312 bytes

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