Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ed8fa288c83bd6ff…

MALICIOUS

PDF

81.7 KB Created: 2021-03-05 19:31:48 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-07
MD5: 6dac9411d4ab3c3f6f486719e76c9c58 SHA-1: bb02101d0c94454433bd30d2f82c6ef9bace07ef SHA-256: ed8fa288c83bd6ffcdd00d96fd7bd6a95911c8dfa53704fe4ca73d09dab11233
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm or phishing operation. The ML classifier and ClamAV both strongly indicate maliciousness. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and numerous external links point towards an attempt to redirect users to malicious or deceptive websites, likely for SEO manipulation or to host phishing content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9993

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://xajibur.ru/strik?utm_term=where+to+buy+speed+queen+washer+and+dryer+sets PDF link annotation
    • https://kabirajozef.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740353/pujikesesapatuxawij.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://terekutididir.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969195/7d630.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4408721/normal_600b928a51f2f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nimukitu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134266418/2748937.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lisulav.iblogger.org/jotivuxa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://panesiwosejel.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739396/wuzasavagawejag.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4383340/normal_6019dcbfaf5ec.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rozolabo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814594/dosove_gudozujoge.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zizonilorixu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134772478/numikobamudiga.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jetijejage.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134319548/9067400475bf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://savejoxip.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134722189/zeberosu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kelodopaseku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406239/beweni.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4481993/normal_6028715878b28.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kujuxase.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134584075/939832f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://luzirilokupozar.rf.gd/1659373960.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nozuwodapa.epizy.com/cisco_vpn_android_ipsec.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c9dcef6a-9a81-4a8e-afc1-41c6ac3c7513/67271518633.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/8f9f1eb9-d91d-4afb-8bb8-b5836c928027/how_to_winterize_a_camper_water_heater.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/cad9adfc-4eac-4e67-a56b-aaf64ce97337/how_to_set_up_a_volunteer_organization.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/4182ac07-cd52-480e-bec8-8f06c879a9d4/ipad_mini_2019_generation.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lotawovuvowuk.rf.gd/wordly_wise_book_4_lesson_5_answers.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/e45fb978-ecdd-48e9-b537-aa4a6eb96926/speak_by_laurie_halse_anderson_genre.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/28c43b3a-f747-402d-9496-e6c4f6fba729/jerev.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/19b21f00-a745-492a-8980-e17776640a69/what_kind_of_charger_does_a_asus_laptop_use.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jejopufopox.rf.gd/31111107366.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0001013a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1013A 5488 bytes
SHA-256: 38a3d2c824ea1327d2c936d06be6ef65c88b64e8f421234f14b4dfbb69572e0a
font_01_sfnt_off000113f0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x113F0 10856 bytes
SHA-256: f3fc8fe93169d8817b90b3082ececb46cba4a288623685d195cbef2490327fed