Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ed8c8a6fef1fdccd…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

260.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2024-05-22
MD5: da0e49bb57b3ff06f77a0337f9db16de SHA-1: 938f385a528f577cdaed71ca8491493f18997fe9 SHA-256: ed8c8a6fef1fdccd0ab164e24aae7e567d0ae9344a98359ed64ff6a1e14ead68
70 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing indicates exploitation of CVE-2017-0199 via an OLE2Link object, which attempts to load a remote resource from http://bitly.cx/owdri. Although no VBA code was found to be executable, the presence of the OLE2Link object and the embedded URL strongly suggest a remote code execution and download attempt. The file is an Excel spreadsheet, a common format for delivering such exploits.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.day.com/dam/1.0
    • http://bitly.cx/owdri
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes