Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ed75bef1e54de3ac…

MALICIOUS

PDF

75.2 KB Created: 2020-11-26 09:43:06 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: ac360fd586fae714c260ff3c777db2f8 SHA-1: d361ba850c3bb808e980431689de629f30254e9f SHA-256: ed75bef1e54de3ac2fa299eba8ba0a5429e69ca513e3116d6d1908f33ffa8c3c
284 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF document contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to disposable hosting services and a malicious redirector. The document's content and heuristics indicate a social engineering lure to install a browser extension or update, likely to facilitate further malicious activity. The presence of multiple links to potentially malicious infrastructure suggests an attempt to distribute malware or phish for credentials.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 7

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffmen.ru/strik?utm_term=power+rangers+theme+song+tab
    • https://latewumopinigan.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134313498/14814.pdf
    • https://vabusidi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134765039/simipumizofagunudam.pdf
    • https://zuzedunili.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134460484/zesotilezuz_kibum_ginaligizof_fumojuwamis.pdf
    • https://luwamagol.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134375262/bojoz.pdf
    • https://raguwamirib.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134630778/75061ed243e2.pdf
    • https://mukaxonalox.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134580963/8893591.pdf
    • https://raxuzorufureraw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775378/siruzewabami_refovafirux.pdf
    • https://vepewose.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134486620/kiron.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4393515/normal_5fa3676e53e58.pdf
    • https://dodixokufeji.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134597977/1314652.pdf
    • https://vazoxavaver.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134863882/virupivanobije.pdf
    • https://pesadosopovito.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134235692/boxexogitem-wurivugukebu-pilamexupitow.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/08ad3fe5-b4bd-4081-897d-368cac70d28a/9747584666.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/68ce9625-e16a-44b2-9a91-51acf5bbe228/adobe_photoshop_elements_10_free_dow.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/a05117a3-e39a-4c39-a572-9bd68ff36192/93809476647.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e7c6.bin
cd9dea233da634b79362149a09d053bbd31cd3fc9ea851a1cfb8b1438cf9dbd1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE7C6 5300 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000f9b8.bin
1a0c5d3a8ee932663935a9ff1a5bbb8c9ed27b34c84850a4e915bc7d2a76ba2d
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF9B8 11308 bytes