Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ed606363f97a4cca…

MALICIOUS

RTF

38.8 KB First seen: 2023-07-21
MD5: 6030cd58a055f41ca34a74afb4581598 SHA-1: f6ed247f47694aec1217e3a8519df6bd1b20486f SHA-256: ed606363f97a4cca99782819d4808b19c914dc6f44aaec8a6c1fc0d51cd752e2
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

The RTF document contains heuristics indicating the presence of an OLE object and a specific vulnerability related to the Equation Editor. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing' to view the content, which is a common tactic for macro-based malware or exploit delivery. The presence of ".objdata" and ".objupdate" further suggests the embedding and activation of malicious OLE objects, likely to trigger an exploit.

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00005389.bin
1cafcf4b81ed82cdd6226fe407e737dc66af59ef4bcf8f9fd703a2c663068c68
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x5389 1377 bytes