Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ed5e58b1e230c24a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

76.0 KB Created: 2021-03-11 19:45:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 501b1dee2ecd18e16f9df756c8d8aec4 SHA-1: ffe9cb06e6a0086b44ce6f05544d12b5d94d0382 SHA-256: ed5e58b1e230c24a49b1a668d5b4f72edf3603865b28fa8fa073aadf136270e3
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The OOXML document contains a VBA project with an AutoOpen macro, which is a common technique for executing malicious code upon opening. The critical heuristic firing indicates the use of the Shell() function, suggesting the macro attempts to download and execute a second-stage payload. The presence of encoded blobs and script obfuscation indicators further supports this malicious intent.

Heuristics 6

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
8b1eea1e7228c464f2f1e155bcd70b1a9c76d09b90e88d8262590030d3225a8e		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 5242 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 6 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
b48806c4371ac152db7bec9c5dc365edfbff6da20a8d6eb4d6aaf69e1cb2cff4		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 28160 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 6 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.