Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ed57af57d99e1c32…

MALICIOUS

PDF

54.3 KB Created: 2020-11-08 13:39:57 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 3604cd9a1168d36025d6000edd5d463d SHA-1: baf1989e64bc59246e2eb9d0935fb005f828ae4a SHA-256: ed57af57d99e1c326d40dcbb479ece3887a400bb5674ffc34c935990dee8dfe0
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document contains numerous embedded links, forming a link farm, and directs users to a suspicious URL disguised as a "chapter 12 dna answer key". The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness, and the PDF structure suggests it's designed to drive traffic to external sites, likely for phishing or malware distribution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://trafffe.ru/aws?keyword=chapter+12+dna+answer+key
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4379961/normal_5f8ee44d14eb5.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4393197/normal_5fa36f30353bd.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4379032/normal_5f91725410643.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/
    • https://matodokabaj.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/cinlerin_esrar_kitab.pdf
    • https://demoxugu.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/79729238162.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c35a4f09-5fcf-4775-9d9d-b009579d3990/bijejesimoniriligeni.pdf
    • https://zudaxobati.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/janer.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/nimuwet/chestionare_redobandire_permis_2019.pdf
    • https://rupuxijod.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/manof.pdf
    • https://pegivafonaj.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/minecraft_ars_magica_2_1._7._10.pdf
    • https://nijubar.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/lopajelelezuziwej.pdf
    • https://sisiviweze.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/goresosuvufat.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6d020e9c-d504-40a6-bcb4-42a56cf835d1/43990223881.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000088c9.bin
03f1e09502704dee2bb97d1d055b68d631bd832b3ad363d529952595a166730c
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x88C9 5108 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00009a36.bin
f538d9f7eb6ebd0c57c5892d70d488169a2a20e3fd839d6b414b97261f40f0aa
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9A36 10376 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000bdea.bin
b50a2106bf82917db0cd3cf88f63c5e8cc3298b343ace5cffc591b35df33d24c
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xBDEA 4324 bytes