RTF malware analysis — malicious · ed537f58d8d40ac0

MALICIOUS

RTF

29.4 KB First seen: 2020-02-04

MD5: 572a1c4426a0023c15f24d984e96099c SHA-1: 1060232e3db160f6e3cc872955db763b12edf9d0 SHA-256: ed537f58d8d40ac0f02f4e1369fb116451f96fb7bae85eb5d5c4b4d14cf9a978

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The ".objupdate" directive forces the activation of this OLE object, leading to the execution of arbitrary code. This is a common technique for delivering malicious payloads via spearphishing attachments.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00006594.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x6594	1815 bytes
SHA-256: `e0bc851a909af634aaee66d788c5eb88ff5dec2ded2f22dd67632d5dea9f1869`

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