Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ed48dc09987c30d5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

101.5 KB Created: 2020-12-15 12:55:25 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-07
MD5: 38770685a4444cb9d80aff5d745c4ccf SHA-1: ef6a64d11957915764d32c1c6f01a9301eb3fe2d SHA-256: ed48dc09987c30d582781a856a1ff439bcd944dbe0f9212be1f97d251d333bd5
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm designed to manipulate search engine results. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent, likely related to phishing or distributing further malware via the linked content. No scripts were extracted, but the PDF structure itself is indicative of a malicious SEO tactic.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://trafffi.ru/123?utm_term=chemistry+and+chemical+reactivity+9th+edition+answers PDF link annotation
    • https://vawuzusafut.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134863851/xufaxisosuw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4379859/normal_5f8b1c720f068.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kololeranazi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134583506/zezifokame.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://redilabow.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134316718/notolufip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ximazula.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738777/xokelubirarizedawud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4452588/normal_5fa0fdeb6ac78.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://livuwijonirib.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134732661/bunawenozusegum_lelik_zelinix.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sugowula.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134646485/fadevasigixetedono.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wetivaxidufe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134891283/621046.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jefapijuwenumik.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134435530/mixovigerolinaxo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5fc2c9dcbf71053ccb1c52c0/t/5fd0cdc406d21916ed764e26/1607519685455/pobifivejajejevupun.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5fc667f3bf71053ccb3540b0/t/5fccf4745d2e6f3bda3e6e6e/1607267445343/mobile_recharge_card_generator_software.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5fc68d526b97992eb5827da1/t/5fd6633a5488895576ab9ac7/1607885628817/3041784817.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00014a9e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14A9E 5492 bytes
SHA-256: 3941e7da3ca8a6ae42a1e6b04aa4cd558953b38f792eee93d53f41f12776ea35
font_01_sfnt_off00015d32.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x15D32 12696 bytes
SHA-256: 7777c9a27bd564fb6736533744260df01b8b39dd7ba31479d6f9b3cb596acea6