Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ed3843a675beca7b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.8 KB Created: 2020-10-01 15:43:31 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-04-07
MD5: f707a1c5211e0b995625ebb17f71937c SHA-1: cb846db3b4a388ab7c67d2bb1428addd03e76fa7 SHA-256: ed3843a675beca7bdda348d40600b6e3252abf459831f91fe50ea72126d925fd
204 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Malformed active-content stream length medium PDF_MALFORMED_EXPLOIT_STREAM_LENGTH
    A PDF stream that carries active/exploit-looking content has a declared /Length that does not match the recovered stream body. Malformed stream boundaries and length mismatches are common parser-evasion/supporting evidence around Reader exploit streams.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/strik?keyword=kvs+ldc+answer+key+2018+pdf In PDF document text
    • http://zonoj.acthighlanddancing.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814297/6698aa63a8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bowiwe.ashleybazer.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131409508/b2303b805e470.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.breakicemarketing.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131455903/xuxekasexisis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.nunavutlearning.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406592/8ce8010a9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kijopobo.kellymichellebaker.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874679/5673650.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036699.mozfiles.com/files/1036699/94020268596.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1038455.mozfiles.com/files/1038455/59673204656.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037824.mozfiles.com/files/1037824/53630615507.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037282.mozfiles.com/files/1037282/rapuvedurub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039644.mozfiles.com/files/1039644/22353692089.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037864.mozfiles.com/files/1037864/dixemakewoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036694.mozfiles.com/files/1036694/36439345165.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036742.mozfiles.com/files/1036742/60893572977.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036838.mozfiles.com/files/1036838/zixobokavikodopo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037081.mozfiles.com/files/1037081/20542251344.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00006b3f.bin)
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00006b3f.bin)
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00006b3f.bin)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006b3f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6B3F 5956 bytes
SHA-256: 00358ce39e47187be39faa688251e9389cc1bb54df00a10b737348888236c0e1
font_01_sfnt_off00007fb5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7FB5 11964 bytes
SHA-256: a85e3b37e42753bf6f0f08b317607702ac2bc26d85d3a01b8a44b6633410ae62