Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ed2623551b1f51f9…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.0 KB
MD5: 7778a1193fb1acfdf58ee56a65d824dd SHA-1: f3d60690aeac6f39965184fe85c67de7b8360bb2 SHA-256: ed2623551b1f51f97623523c00f629cd7f6bf59c59907cb152a1d1d13b1d9b8b
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering heuristics related to Equation Editor exploitation. The presence of ".objdata" sections and the ".objupdate" directive strongly indicate that the document is designed to leverage a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component to achieve arbitrary code execution upon opening.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000b7.bin
7d7f6ab3895e581102a3296d313dd67c3ac930ded199d9f43d921ada8e12bb4e
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB7 1772 bytes