RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · ed0d4754b706891c

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.62 MB First seen: 2022-03-09

MD5: 7447308a772872df77d4ee7257207b9c SHA-1: 9a0c0528a567404d958335877963b8ec098ce0b7 SHA-256: ed0d4754b706891c39af5e3672630309389ffb9465407d5ce732bafd3ba60c4b

220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The RTF file contains embedded OLE object data, specifically related to Equation Editor, which is a strong indicator of exploitation for CVE-2017-11882. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `CVE_2017_11882_RELATED` heuristics confirms this. The `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristic suggests that the OLE object is automatically activated upon opening the document, leading to the execution of the embedded payload. The large amount of hex-encoded data within the OLE object further supports the hiding of a malicious payload.

Heuristics 5

Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED

RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX

RTF contains ~1691KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001a2e.bin` `1f49c227acd9e591e96cd2d7e5899c3e0bc317249cd7293097fb6b62a9b8de2f`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1A2E	845872 bytes

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