Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ed0046e5d5a7e7f2…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

39.0 KB First seen: 2023-04-04
MD5: f95d9c25a6d46c34ea9a980840b98e32 SHA-1: 4e3a54fb36b55d1cb49ffaff71a1d91d6fb94371 SHA-256: ed0046e5d5a7e7f2024ade83167f3dc63a87abbbd3b9b451b2b59513645dd179
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with an Equation Editor ProgID, triggered by \objupdate, indicating an attempt to exploit a vulnerability. The document body explicitly prompts the user to 'Enable editing', a common lure for macro-based malware delivery. The presence of an embedded OLE object further supports the likelihood of an exploit being delivered.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00005563.bin
e9af5ba6253aae38a2b3657e7ce0958b7ee4d63de4b8645fcd1e28b7171c5a95
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x5563 1980 bytes