Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ecef57afce8a7d5e…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

229.2 KB
MD5: afe48e30fc3f12c2b6ad7d19ae1fff8e SHA-1: 2ded99867d8b3e9499b10743ae732efec19ccc8e SHA-256: ecef57afce8a7d5eed2080401da0ce36d67c2493cf1385b432a6bf0a65f6e521
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, including an automatically linked object that is forced to update upon opening. This technique, combined with the 'enable lure' heuristic, strongly suggests the document is designed to trick the user into activating embedded content, which is a common method for delivering malware. No specific family could be identified, and no scripts or URLs were extracted for further IOCs.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000965.bin
bd0fda77f8ea243218a6a112f6afd5579658b445ff46ffc29d98168476b3b7d1
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x965 20618 bytes
objdata_01_off0000b18c.bin
18cff8ef194415d33763880bf64011d23305e4b9143b76244b89e1c53b70a0d5
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB18C 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off0000c72f.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC72F 12297 bytes