Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 eced933900d3b577…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

172.0 KB First seen: 2022-10-04
MD5: 57f8580f86d70641a671cba41fa912fb SHA-1: 71f6df3c43bbe9027e1128765cee4b9d597e8ab1 SHA-256: eced933900d3b57782f82b5ce04fdaaa1d72e05f3b58b19c36bbc321e0306311
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell T1071.001 Web Protocols

The file is an Office document encrypted with a default password, indicating it's likely a carrier for malicious content. The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-0199 confirms the exploitation of a remote code execution vulnerability. The embedded URL points to a remote document, suggesting the sample's primary purpose is to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007, AES)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://document_docs@104.168.32.131/uuuuUASDbjasduhuasduyuASHUDHUSADHUASDU/jhjjhjhjhhggftftftftftftf.doc