Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ece02f669413ac91…

MALICIOUS

PDF

83.7 KB Created: 2021-03-23 22:02:41 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 34301918eb68c4e3e53f3cda8fdbbd65 SHA-1: 65e5bd892e129f90ddffaa6db4e739169f7368f4 SHA-256: ece02f669413ac91aaeff6d01aa989accd74dcbb5c6631ca92124fadf6b4b127
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The file is a PDF that contains an embedded URL pointing to a domain associated with malware distribution. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent, likely a phishing or trojan delivery mechanism. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded URI heuristic suggest it's designed to trick users into downloading a payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 4

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://mezovuduw.ru/wix?keyword=documents+to+go+key+apk
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4422908/normal_601675ad9dc76.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4417312/normal_5fcfaa03d4557.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4476273/normal_601fbeb7cbabe.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4417327/normal_5fc8d3bda0ddc.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4373992/normal_5ff5fd4473981.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4379369/normal_60133e0113c90.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4465564/normal_602a97a27462e.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4368964/normal_5fcfe8167f09e.pdf
    • http://vawubarisef.22web.org/395493159.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4425921/normal_600badbc29e5d.pdf
    • http://tevoriveterusof.22web.org/kizexedeji.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4445341/normal_604e8a9831a6a.pdf
    • http://papotanepif.22web.org/cecelia_ahern_a_place_called_here.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4481418/normal_603b43894c380.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4476567/normal_602953edb1d52.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4491153/normal_6053554ba89e2.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://mufuniwikolokil.epizy.com/honeywell_lynx_touch_manual_espaol.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/2f15c0fc-18ba-479b-8b3b-ce0b699665c9/mokoxigaxefirom.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/63d3d635-bb57-4ee4-8f12-31769223a651/data_analysis_training_online_free.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d6b77e98-ec2c-49d0-811b-12cd3a8fd161/45909064455.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c907eb99-a59a-4a7b-978f-0cd9b73f6f52/2202742612.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ea4685b5-cf3c-46df-a96b-3190c1882361/is_there_a_dantes_inferno_movie.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000fe1a.bin
a319eff008bd5c78bf14db5802507a03b0a27521be53bb696592db9b2b994c70		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFE1A 5292 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00011024.bin
5c671f5910d77ba8d12db075a1eef600c39e928a9ae816989a94a3a69840d345		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11024 15564 bytes

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