Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ecccc2ef1c439076…

MALICIOUS

PDF

54.0 KB Created: 2021-03-23 22:02:58 +00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft® Word for Microsoft 365 First seen: 2021-04-10
MD5: 6af705d7ed934253ea052a2a742e6f87 SHA-1: 73fba5a56b0afd444394e0df8624c4074787e058 SHA-256: ecccc2ef1c439076da4112739e98d61a8f987e751694bddf87da1f851188f620
64 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier clean score 0.0398

Heuristics 4

  • Image-only PDF lure links to a brand-impersonating path on an unrelated host high PDF_IMAGE_LURE_BRAND_PATH_LINK
    PDF is image-heavy with little real text and its clickable action targets a URL carrying a brand name ('wetransfer') as a path segment on a host that does not belong to that brand and is not known-good (e.g. 'sodecoperu.com/Docusign/index.php'). This is the credential-phishing carrier shape where a compromised or unrelated host serves a brand-named phishing kit behind a screenshot-like lure page. Distinct from the typosquat-host rule: here the host is honest-looking but the brand lives in the path.
  • Image-only document with action trigger (screenshot lure) medium PDF_IMAGE_LURE
    PDF has 1 image(s), only 0 text block(s), carries a click-outward action, and is only 54 KB — typical shape of a phishing lure where a full-page screenshot hides a clickable button that launches or submits to an attacker URL.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://chefandbarista.gr/wewe/WeTransfer/WeTransfer/WeTransfer PDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/ctfontshttp://lucasfonts.comMicrosoftIn PDF document text
    • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIT_LicenseIn PDF document text
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/fonts/default.aspxIn PDF document text
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicrosoftTimeStampPCA.crl0XIn PDF document text
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftTimeStampPCA.crt0In PDF document text
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/microsoftrootcert.crl0TIn PDF document text
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftRootCert.crt0In PDF document text
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/MicCodSigPCA2011_2011-07-08.crl0aIn PDF document text
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/certs/MicCodSigPCA2011_2011-07-08.crt0In PDF document text
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicRooCerAut2011_2011_03_22.crl0^In PDF document text
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicRooCerAut2011_2011_03_22.crt0��In PDF document text
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/docs/primarycps.htm0@In PDF document text
    • http://www.microsoft.com/Typography/0In PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007b81.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7B81 73420 bytes
SHA-256: 1ebd98a525eabb357c3271e885f31a3a7c4d3efc2e6861dd69738e9ab0491f97

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