RTF malware analysis — malicious · ec8a1a1f6a66e4fd

MALICIOUS

RTF

10.7 KB

MD5: ca938aa8efa849645e2da674deaffa56 SHA-1: 7c948075e499a942aa9d23f455e1ac903c4ab45b SHA-256: ec8a1a1f6a66e4fd95d79689594e4675e4f54273db2d77263eac8f5a7e800c13

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains OLE object data and specifically targets the Equation Editor vulnerability. The ".objupdate" directive indicates that the embedded OLE object is intended to be activated, likely to trigger the exploit. While no specific payload URLs or scripts were extracted, the heuristics strongly suggest a malicious document designed to exploit Equation Editor for payload delivery.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000015ec.bin` `cb83dec5b629cfce4590854d3d93b317337f4e1221885c9f44c8e4261976efe5`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x15EC	1623 bytes

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