Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ec6d0458a71a3e07…

MALICIOUS

RTF

38.6 KB First seen: 2023-02-20
MD5: 70832ea61e7a8ceb07afb9b6d00e76b6 SHA-1: eee7d575d0964c7810568454f47652eb20f73fae SHA-256: ec6d0458a71a3e07cc9511e54e0bf83c1a449da3ce6fb0c21dc15160d7522f77
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a ProgID indicative of the Equation Editor, which is known to be vulnerable. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, and the document body includes a lure to 'Enable editing' to bypass security measures. This combination strongly suggests an attempt to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability via user interaction.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004989.bin
b6cca81389cccaa58eab483a5eb9bc6b0777fb92269243343c8dc4e5fe9fec42
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4989 1600 bytes