Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ec6c8521b9f93180…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.5 KB Created: 2020-08-02 01:50:44 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 89ea34c0100938bba4e643c7a46895b9 SHA-1: 5d6972a7f86d1ca50f2b2741eee1514acdb984f3 SHA-256: ec6c8521b9f93180dc77968d652bce3b0b3338b737586fb49ba34387cb13363b
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, with one pointing to a known malicious redirector. The document body is heavily obfuscated and appears to be junk data, but the presence of the malicious redirector URL and the link farm heuristic strongly suggest a malicious intent. The primary goal appears to be directing users to malicious infrastructure through a link farm.

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=matplotlib+scatter+plot
    • http://files.ana-ramirez.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776110/rokutuzinebe_zutumizoparobi.pdf
    • http://files.luminoushealingtouch.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383892/1189979.pdf
    • http://files.conservationaffair.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857304/timepiboxu.pdf
    • http://files.theteenspire.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775830/14f1c97e48b72a9.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/66916333827.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/xanixiki.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/91300886864.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/8907/6117/files/98177929572.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/4655/8106/files/15108972117.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/8615/9767/files/6135411231.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/0564/8807/files/18982832196.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/8734/0454/files/pogojefijuvipagezisaxukef.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/2385/9873/files/52489622254.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/1729/8329/files/stand_by_me_oasis_chords.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/6329/5654/files/54368858203.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/6231/2616/files/fegafovixovet.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006c13.bin
5c2c734dd38be4a2ecd3cba22de459b0afdd95106f2762634dc83f19621a16b1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6C13 5072 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007d61.bin
30f7dfd0bd6cac54e7376dcb5d3efef1d283940cdde8d8d156b5275f11a4abcf
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7D61 12308 bytes