Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ec6ba57cc3132693…

MALICIOUS

PDF

82.5 KB Created: 2021-09-07 12:22:02 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-11
MD5: aee9089c7df616b739208671efdac649 SHA-1: 520bdcf300910851f7d04efc5bdb277b31940b66 SHA-256: ec6ba57cc3132693bce151ccc25093fcfa09ac42fb3854233a06aa1e719da656
144 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF contains embedded JavaScript and a high number of links pointing to various websites, many of which appear to be compromised CMS uploads. The primary goal seems to be to redirect the user to download further malicious content, likely exploiting vulnerabilities within the PDF reader or the linked content. The ML classifier strongly indicates malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9955

Heuristics 7

  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://laborke.ru/uplcv?utm_term=introduction+to+data+science+textbook+pdf PDF link annotation
    • https://www.lightingdynamics.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f12c6ada975a014793fb8e263dc9d08a/25540356606.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://c2mag.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a4272103ea6---sufepix.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://odessawa.com/userfiles/file/9668516585.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://assytekservizi.com/userfiles/files/gipise.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://alakharia.com/public_html/userfiles/file/78101090000.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://woods-china.cn/ci2/userfiles/files/20210720095022.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cantellodetersiviprofessionali.it/uploads/file/1898033028.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.beachesbrewing.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/396f59efd44406939de57a9625922f7b/suwolajafam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://glosunspa.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160d7d9d9d4998---sedowajaxomobazewezobap.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://travels-ukraine.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160d2452c6bc0a---28291554274.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://santiagoporter.com/js/ckfinder/core/connector/php/files/25722453748.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aonetreks.com/uploads/file/92641336276.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://allegypttours.net/userfiles/files/diwuvaxugi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nuestratierrapremios.com/campannas/file/79539736885.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.x454.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9a088rbunmgth6j1l5qi0cnma5/metigizu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jrjohnsonfamilyreunion.com/clients/0/09/090f04f22b165063c0e57546eb93b169/File/74817883304.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://debeight.net/UserFiles/File/daseba.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://puertoestereo.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/df692av2o848o8v74kftjieadr/71370075419.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://chandigarhdatarecovery.com/files/file/nezetijigimopip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://a1-automotivegroup.com/upload/files/febubelati.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ascinfratech.com/clientprojects/trading/file/zizujafepazuso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://homeaestheticsllc.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3b1dec79dc68048f182e83c6b7490e1e/wixobirozujebut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://adabaskimerkezi.com/upload/file/kodatogub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://estidevelopers.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/65ba8682aa4d9e155daae900733dc290/17079213203.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000dc29.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDC29 17768 bytes
SHA-256: e9e91987b01e13416919a5a7a6e840991d6cf244943111836024322484fadd3d
font_01_sfnt_off00010ac3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10AC3 10952 bytes
SHA-256: 05adc79eb3cbb40c22e66a25b12a7a9b88377ea843966fca60de471482fefe10
font_02_sfnt_off0001241f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1241F 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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