Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ec6a0c58471542e8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

84.4 KB Created: 2020-05-15 02:23:54 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-09-24
MD5: d17ad5d981267402d17531460bb5993c SHA-1: 363dc2e4873e8003443f82beca0b14288ff8e8d1 SHA-256: ec6a0c58471542e87514dc0a6cc620136aa412b15e0525bb7d20282939f0d389
144 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF document exhibits malicious behavior by employing a 'Clipboard command execution lure', instructing the user to paste content into a shell, which is a common technique for executing malicious code. It also functions as a link farm, containing numerous external URLs that likely lead to further malicious content or payloads. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness, supporting the observed attack patterns.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://bellissimoconfections.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775702/130775702.html#accounting+information+system+romney+ppt PDF link annotation
    • http://sophiebernier.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131858353/00b5e5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://thebarnatcrookedpinesfarm.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131378796/wipogijaf_liwotekila_tabevidebedud_wuzatukorevi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kindkvist.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131163834/rolumalexazudano.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pro2290.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438079/f1951df564bdc16.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://isthisproblematic.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739923/takepasejebu_disovaxujusidad_pajevi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kinglobby.net/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740191/7e752.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://allbodies.store/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070652/vipitapilewapeg-romopupitakiw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tandit21.store/uploads/1/3/0/3/130323154/1245577.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mailstreamdirect.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738740/6d84b03c7c16.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bbeboutiquellc.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398097/929ae07d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mindbodyface.ca/uploads/1/3/0/6/130620845/xerifokevawifiw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000105ff.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x105FF 12968 bytes
SHA-256: e8d8df769fbb5b9f857371e4a7bb07a858c819f98a7e67848eb3f5cfee27c6d9
font_01_sfnt_off0001309e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1309E 16204 bytes
SHA-256: c988415812f594187b0a0ed75dc52802e798e1695b49bd300f8412a65040a449