Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ec69450ffb674fb7…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

569.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2022-11-16
MD5: 64b1d48fd8c41fc6f7aa5a43b0ea464a SHA-1: 90d2cdcb212fab4336a34cbb54b44c3849a41b34 SHA-256: ec69450ffb674fb751914a0336e7c68d7f21b62f94f452c5dc6e8aed0cb265f9
148 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The critical heuristic firing for CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE indicates the exploitation of a known vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. This, combined with the presence of an OLE object, strongly suggests the file is designed to execute arbitrary code. No VBA macros were found to contain executable statements, but the embedded OLE package likely contains the exploit payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP ECX) high SC_GETPC_CALL
    x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP ECX)
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
42aefbb1b1c72dfa1b141dc15d67a09ed37dd6faf0eda4b2b0d1db7f4c9f9d77
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD002DA03B/ole10nATIVE 1691 bytes