Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Heuristics 5

• PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
  PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
• Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
  Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
• Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
  PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
• Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
  The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL https://cctraff.ru/aws?keyword=alice+where+are+you+going In PDF document text

  • https://jawasolasazilem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379174/wewebunovemerifabo.pdfIn PDF document text
  • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365657/normal_5f9b1a6d6dfd1.pdfIn PDF document text
  • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365660/normal_5f87112463c26.pdfIn PDF document text
  • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4386347/normal_5f8f084f55539.pdfIn PDF document text
  • https://xukanimuwuvam.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132696198/2327983.pdfIn PDF document text
  • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00003f50.bin)
  • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00003f50.bin)
  • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In extracted file (font_02_sfnt_off000073a1.bin)
  • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0501/0443/4856/files/gigomixobakawakenedabijip.pdfIn PDF document text
  • https://s3.amazonaws.com/piwupevivotixi/tom_ford_white_suede_body_spray.pdfIn PDF document text
  • https://s3.amazonaws.com/gujutavevive/22117675445.pdfIn PDF document text
  • https://s3.amazonaws.com/salosibejodod/zewagobubugesikuk.pdfIn PDF document text
  • https://s3.amazonaws.com/subud/57181474569.pdfIn PDF document text
  • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
  • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
  • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00003f50.bin)

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