Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ec63707d6c6d6f06…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

154.5 KB Created: 2017-12-27 16:50:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 12.0000 First seen: 2019-05-31
MD5: 58810256a122133b2852298f38605210 SHA-1: 45bce43553b14c73f11331ad725b267d6dda2a5c SHA-256: ec63707d6c6d6f06d0b4afece7087bdd27d61ad9685b77f4d2673865e193ab17
130 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an OOXML document containing an embedded OLE object with indicators for an executable payload, specifically identified as a VBScript. The document body prompts the user to click a link to continue, which likely triggers the execution of the embedded malicious content. This suggests an attempt to exploit CVE-2026-21514 to deliver a secondary payload.

Heuristics 5

  • OOXML Ole10Native with payload/link indicators — possible CVE-2026-21514 high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Office document contains embedded OLE (word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin) with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. This is a likely CVE-2026-21514 exploitation shape.
  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • External hyperlinks (1) low OOXML_EXTERNAL_HYPERLINKS
    Document contains 1 external hyperlink — clickable URLs are stored as external relationships. First target: https://www.unrwa.org/ar
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006 In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • https://www.unrwa.org/arDocument hyperlink

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 302080 bytes
SHA-256: cd6aab596030df47d24fb880d4432bb36c79ede028f78277b037b37774dd8dd8
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 296970 bytes
SHA-256: 0400e548354544c479598411799a4bd417fd204f491b6e622ebc826226976aa0
emf_00.emf ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5456 bytes
SHA-256: c96aa57467a21d68dc080810e6fd89db16c58d3ea120a64eee83e2866bc7041f

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