Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ec554399e485b8f2…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

14.8 KB
MD5: 18447bf8c0d1729f8d12b6996389495d SHA-1: 6a5585e45dd15d58a04e83b987b80031fa008da4 SHA-256: ec554399e485b8f2581a5d3f1823c58a9c220f07ae78a6f203ab1a0781d0671a
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution

The sample is an RTF document that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability, indicated by the RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR, RTF_OBJAUTLINK, and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristic firings. This exploit likely facilitates the download and execution of a secondary payload, a common technique for delivering malware. The presence of OLE object data further supports the exploitation of embedded objects within the document.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000768.bin
a71cb5a5c77c47a98a025c1e921c3968bf770099727d83b20b27b678f2708497
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x768 1721 bytes