PDF malware analysis — malicious · ec1bbd689cb4d99f

MALICIOUS

PDF

7.9 KB

MD5: bccab1c9bbd35c3e0698668af6a8fcba SHA-1: fce4e87e065bbc4975014844495478b800cb75d1 SHA-256: ec1bbd689cb4d99f626f96f4eff734751f2e63ea79b26f10b8656043a35c07df

166 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF contains heavily obfuscated JavaScript, indicated by multiple heuristic firings including 'PDF_JS_OBFUSCATED_DROPPER' and 'PDF_UNESCAPE'. The ClamAV detection 'Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36086' further confirms its malicious nature. The embedded JavaScript is designed to act as a dropper, likely downloading and executing additional malicious content from external sources, although the specific URLs are not directly visible in the provided evidence.

Heuristics 7

ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36086 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36086
unescape() call high PDF_UNESCAPE

unescape() found — often used to decode shellcode in PDF JS exploits (matched inside decoded stream)
Obfuscated multi-stage PDF JavaScript dropper high PDF_JS_OBFUSCATED_DROPPER

PDF JavaScript shows 3 independent signals of exploit-kit-style multi-stage obfuscation: annot_subject_stage, incremental_eval_build, repeated_pluginschk. This is strongly consistent with pre-2011 Adobe Reader PDF droppers — OpenAction JS reads encoded data from annotation subjects, decodes it through one or more hex / base-N loops, and invokes eval indirectly (method name built one character at a time). The actual CVE is hidden in the final decoded layer and is not visible via static analysis.
JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT

PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS

PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
syncAnnotScan annotation-staging primitive low PDF_FOXIT_SYNCANNOTSCAN

PDF JavaScript calls syncAnnotScan() — a no-op annotation-enumeration primitive used by exploit-kit JavaScript to stage payload reads from annotation /Subject fields before eval(). Not a vulnerable sink itself; rarely seen in legitimate PDFs. (matched in decompressed stream)
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`javascript_obj0006_000.js` `f9b4659beaf681d266cfb5046d495e7b144d406eff72e71ecd4d1451ae25ca11`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 6 at offset 0x143	481 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
`legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js` `cf19928210b9852a67f2d9d5d387e4f8eb2194eb9a42682482fad37e16ac53cf`	deobfuscated-js	repeated-marker hex decoded JavaScript at offset 0x1A02	1857 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 2 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
`deobfuscated.js` `f9dcd30006593dd4f7d48d324ecba02552d700d8040f501f27d88df7c5206758`	deobfuscated-js	PDF JavaScript deobfuscation pass	22286 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 4 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 2 long base64-like blob(s).

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