Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ec0e579ffb795647…

MALICIOUS

PDF

43.0 KB Created: 2020-10-07 06:25:13 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-15
MD5: 12e8daa26f6813d5d254cc9de2e67abd SHA-1: 33d26c8105553961c38a69a384a5244b9d63a1d0 SHA-256: ec0e579ffb795647c7f967ea57794a46f9e7ab580141484480e1e35610096d7d
184 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/strik?keyword=why+is+trump+orange In PDF document text
    • https://site-1038874.mozfiles.com/files/1038874/gariloromu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036936.mozfiles.com/files/1036936/16783707732.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037233.mozfiles.com/files/1037233/rojigolexi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.thsbusinessed.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398547/zazexituvet.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.scottishsocietyofplaywrights.co.uk/uploads/1/3/2/7/132741225/f1ab93642.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zakeko.jamesmhannanseacadets.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814339/2806290.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rukokapi.hounganjulian.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814292/mudezolimafixij.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zuvixez.wrathofachilles.net/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406982/6ad58d17fbe06d7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0496/8113/7821/files/baresakidevesosubasowif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/7658/2552/files/kimi_no_na_wa_mitsuha_death.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/7372/4825/files/shoe_glue_near_me.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0483/6858/2809/files/53677570140.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0483/0461/9684/files/rizubipobobawamuminipej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/7ae9e3d9-db80-49c5-8faf-0643f254088b/muvamaxulimovigi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/a3708997-310a-44fc-bd02-ed69346d0575/zunalofopirapo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/45e341e0-4c94-4ad2-bb65-78790cff5f63/jumuxupapo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6c9e779a-90b1-4564-a47b-f1f777026160/12887874721.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006913.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6913 5316 bytes
SHA-256: 4512e7d12c0111ac5b914e1c8311e9f9d93f8ab1508373e3e011f23aa3917519
font_01_sfnt_off00007b14.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7B14 10716 bytes
SHA-256: c63699a23f5232f06ac4105b8c08c83437128af658362fa381d7114b566033c5

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