Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ec0e557034f0053e…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

23.6 KB First seen: 2023-01-23
MD5: 5d3af01a360b1bc320a2e9cd7bffe87d SHA-1: 96ea0c86efb6ad82978625d62915f3335980dcd3 SHA-256: ec0e557034f0053e190dac8b43c0bc14663d43d46cbb5c61d166bceae9dcb187
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating exploitation of CVE-2017-11882. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, and the document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing'. This combination strongly suggests a malicious document designed to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability to execute a payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000040aa.bin
8f4439507a7ba9677fef99e8225edc13975e79a341530b83aeddc49ce3023c62
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x40AA 1510 bytes