Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ec0aa758a4dd1710…

MALICIOUS

PDF

61.3 KB Created: 2020-11-05 08:23:18 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-02-23
MD5: 1e1acf9442458b2ae7559998553069c3 SHA-1: e629b11bac4f6452f33d444c1b247c4da17379b9 SHA-256: ec0aa758a4dd171030e00deb8ade8df2c17b2e21fbf48a222d6bc19a52726f91
234 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/123?keyword=photoshop+cs4+keyboard+shortcuts In PDF document text
    • https://gepobuxew.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070920/kejowuxagatof.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gasipepimajut.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134367512/solezujisejujovap.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4414358/normal_5f9cdc87e836b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d69ba9b0-a014-4c38-917a-002ff578e91b/mage_armor_dragon_age_inquisition.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/75793b0c-d256-4fa1-9db8-5dfd506d68bd/dusuremib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/8afd770d-7980-4933-8650-cd40d03f3b55/guxura.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/68f6c560-ff46-4217-93d0-b5bc875a85e4/28434697290.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/gaxuremewuger/xotubimomerejavatetenuvoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/kijelopazekune/4596305520.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b36404e7-e4a7-4a49-a189-4eb674aaec67/67366082097.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/0027a518-4419-48c3-8f68-c7e5359b6121/jakajalab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005f2c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5F2C 14060 bytes
SHA-256: 2226c569b0d1263fc33c22c26b5dcd7b2b4a1e8bc8cd38e0c6bbd637af1d2fac
font_01_sfnt_off00008cf0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8CF0 5252 bytes
SHA-256: b68004fb542e64f3a479621a74e21507d750615b18930d14627c49d0178de6c7
font_02_sfnt_off00009ee0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9EE0 10772 bytes
SHA-256: 3e57a67efac3409e8ce7bcd871251fdc8d9357a5a8be649038321b6010653932
font_03_sfnt_off0000c3dd.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC3DD 16388 bytes
SHA-256: a4f616c8ed03231f927c8f6725ddfb6aed79ba1e9c0c9257d690ec40f184d4cc
font_04_sfnt_off0000d96c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD96C 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 0d0f64e27578eb124b8bc81c7eceacdd166e22eddd95c81328e9fbd7de2a6333

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