Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ebf07cf4ab0a316d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

75.3 KB Created: 2021-03-03 20:33:35 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-22
MD5: 20ae7a542e2de505fbf9ef36b2526508 SHA-1: 9d364791c983c47f6b0632c4e641c591eb742cf8 SHA-256: ebf07cf4ab0a316d2d18bde558a89ccdf6870eb911ee6cc23183327e373b8cff
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document was flagged as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier. The file embeds a large number of external links characteristic of an SEO link farm. Specific URLs and indicators for this sample are listed in the indicators section.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://pelibifir.ru/wix?keyword=the+blanket+by+floyd+dell+answer+key PDF link annotation
    • http://boforotaje.mywebcommunity.org/2020_ford_mustang_gt_premium_0_to_60.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vatidenow.medianewsonline.com/92786260773.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/nugopanage/dzD7YmT/17066256189.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dopovebo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134431975/a13b01e5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zuzilenew.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134527977/supamopulutesejenava.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/gofelaxes/jPJp6hd/zimiruxaxonupiv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://komuwewolidixat.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134871085/7ca54856c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://depalowivejal.iblogger.org/ketidigabofavajakowam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nejevefivi.mypressonline.com/79727604487.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lozepexowazabi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131409761/xezowaloveded.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://damozudi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776403/jibawokobujiviz-letamud-matiwo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fojojaroj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453509/julemiparigom-bubowubuditodud-zitoxeneken.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zorivaleguzovul.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134596353/duzibofazebolo_jitegod_zojomifu_puzef.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • http://fiwujugisijema.epizy.com/mijulizabafevufo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vajubugi.epizy.com/nemofotubarel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000dd5a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDD5A 5084 bytes
SHA-256: f2801f906a90a8bc7fe0bbad96b87ecceeca23d3925cd1ad0a575ffe4b7a34be
font_01_sfnt_off0000eeaa.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEEAA 10376 bytes
SHA-256: af001d458aac61cf5dab16f9bf318ca943aa39d207170498cc48151adfaa3a61
font_02_sfnt_off000111ea.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x111EA 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 4fcfa7c68d76e23b667942a3ac892d2d5d88346478daafc61479ad4df4af3dd3

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