Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ebe779149a0fdce3…

MALICIOUS

PDF

77.9 KB Created: 2021-06-11 22:54:14 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-23
MD5: 6223b45d2bd01da328a2de1c36de56b6 SHA-1: 9a92cc28e528f5302a12f51cb3106ebb38f81821 SHA-256: ebe779149a0fdce35ddd70b202fbb3f3d35055296c1adace8544008477ce28e9
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains numerous links to external websites, many of which are hosted on compromised WordPress sites, suggesting a link farm or distribution point for malicious content. The 'SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE' heuristic indicates the document instructs the user to execute commands, likely to download and run a second-stage payload. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly support a malicious classification.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://inwebjor.ru/uplcv?utm_term=download+windows+8+pro+32+bit+iso PDF link annotation
    • http://olsztyntransportmedyczny.pl/userfiles/file/13351375880.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://studiogreenwich.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3181754309167f6aa830882294fe4235/moxapenir.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://benchmarktransitions.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a77a23d8392---51949042167.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://webfox.net.au/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f0b8b70d0fcae06f9e5829608b169fb2/bagumuwuvub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cetinelektrik.com.tr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c05727dd18e---75639304444.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lawina-radom.pl/files/file/loruv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kasargod.net/uploads/file/gaver.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://aeskulap24h.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16082c21d307ce---306938824.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://connect.allianceflooring.net/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/23e047063de4b25e22898a5b9681a63f/45795877900.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.risingstars.com.tr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609c8dc2566ce---9589988177.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://agsposure.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/84ca5f42b3ee0c36f097a8ee8fd5cdb2/ranefabusapow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://begemot-rus.com/uploadfiles/file/2021052602382473499.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.associatedomains.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a20a6d6f122---lafawoxelerezazapufoxebof.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.sudburyhighspeedinternet.ca/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/abb44eb99f4706875cc3bf98eef4b8bc/zedukowuxusapakaf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ohligschlaeger-berger.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608eedffa2056---62356090037.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e4c9.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE4C9 5344 bytes
SHA-256: 7c86c08ff6903a4f68ae3abe325b429e74ac6c2b8f46e14b40c452787a2ecc9f
font_01_sfnt_off0000f6f8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF6F8 11264 bytes
SHA-256: 382a44647f6622983b2bd4aa360f6cc37f692ac9200769c2d7ecc2778d56cb91
font_02_sfnt_off00011cde.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11CDE 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 9f355172d696dda274cac500966718f112ce76951f19577ac4888987ea6471b2

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