Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ebe4fe1b4588447f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOCX

277.5 KB Created: 2020-07-14 09:43:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 05b75bd6bc817a75afee29cd4aad22a4 SHA-1: 69d16e2d284007fffb26f974794d8e7919ee55b1 SHA-256: ebe4fe1b4588447fb651247841973ec9df3f7d8ee2d1785f53b3806de0853568
268 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample contains a Document_Open VBA macro that uses CreateObject and ShellExecute APIs, indicating it attempts to execute arbitrary code. The macro likely downloads and executes a second-stage payload, as suggested by the use of these execution APIs and the presence of embedded VBA macros. The document body was unreadable, but the heuristics strongly suggest malicious intent.

Heuristics 9

  • Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS
    Reference to CreateProcess API
  • Reference to ShellExecute API high SC_STR_SHELLEXEC
    Reference to ShellExecute API
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/sharepoint/v3/contenttype/forms
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/customXml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/metadata/contentType
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/metadata/properties/
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/metadata/properties/metaAttributes
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/metadata/properties
    • http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/documentManagement/types
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/infopath/2007/PartnerControls
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/metadata/core-properties
    • http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://purl.org/dc/terms/
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/internal/obd
    • http://dublincore.org/schemas/xmls/qdc/2003/04/02/dc.xsd
    • http://dublincore.org/schemas/xmls/qdc/2003/04/02/dcterms.xsd

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
6d2e2ef78749fb31b1256da62f12b9e27085f30a3d7c8373c418df06e097ca05
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 6970 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.