Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ebcba9a758682ade…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

2.29 MB
MD5: f3a4ac316750587869f17defd11440e8 SHA-1: 9b14523017a0f9461e9efad1fcae2806c6b87161 SHA-256: ebcba9a758682adeafb825ba6bba961750cd023f55d069d4e3c17b951d0991d2
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1566 Phishing T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an encrypted Office XLSX file that contains an Equation Editor OLE object. Heuristics indicate this object is anomalous and likely carries a payload, exploiting CVE-2018-0798. The default encryption password suggests a common exploit carrier. No document body or scripts were extractable, but the presence of the Equation Editor exploit strongly implies a malicious payload delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • CVE-2018-0798 — anomalous Equation Editor native stream high CVE likely CVE_2018_0798_EQUATION_NATIVE_ANOMALY
    Default-encrypted OOXML contains embedded Equation Editor data with anomalous native stream bytes consistent with a CVE-2018-0798-style exploit. This is treated as likely CVE evidence because the Equation object is malformed and payload-like.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Equation Editor object carries payload-like Ole10Native stream high OLE_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE_PAYLOAD_ANOMALY
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object declares the Equation Editor CLSID but stores a large high-entropy Ole10Native stream with malformed package sizing. This is exploit-shaped Equation/OLE payload evidence.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.

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