Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ebcaa37f212b77e6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

74.2 KB Created: 2021-03-01 22:48:39 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-26
MD5: 3973a7daa8051d3d693d137a9b3caec5 SHA-1: f145f36591e941f39ff8aaa7fd70eaf9859be734 SHA-256: ebcaa37f212b77e61dbd0c3ef5900fafc520aafe136f614cee7cd513691d7f82
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious content. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for phishing or malware distribution. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and link farm heuristics point towards a malicious document designed to exploit user trust.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9996

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://maypoin.ru/strik?utm_term=what+is+an+environmental+impact+assessment+pdf PDF link annotation
    • https://gafajabi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134880466/fofawixin-gavikizebij.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/juvebuzizej/asicihd/ribitumadizobezi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/mixasuwekov/Lhhgmhc/xajoridejusukofefokiruvi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vufepuxo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134522835/3006291.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/manuguwe/ifu3TVm/samsung_galaxy_xcover_4s_enterprise_edition_review.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wevinavuligi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134505150/panafogibaleves.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vizelupavew/jjjaicx/70488523960.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fedaxowazujiwiz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134012387/6d7f57.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://punizino.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134327780/jasusajibikug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/gawagunikuw/igjx7ia/xuwuwuzuzevupomuwa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/kisilusotuke/NTSggNb/tejikivud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vawikepaf/RWhG6K7/marketplace_application_id.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/munuluxel/hc1gcia/jalogedujokozoteruva.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dadizatutelebi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070904/5444874.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ziliseze.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134855349/fumotimakokekon-wadiwolujanofo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jekugisolidib.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134097103/tipesib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/fobonelaga/18ibQBg/life_after_death_tvb_songs.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wujodibu/pulazafovebagizopumegeva.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/godoremitiwuja/aisi_316.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fazajupozapufo.rf.gd/xavobigawup.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/fulosobezur/37322606966.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xuzed/jedudaxikinarorenurabuzer.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e47f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE47F 5468 bytes
SHA-256: a1dbcac43491619de129cbe4f7f1b53e022604316030aadf7a1ee49db36d1ee0
font_01_sfnt_off0000f700.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF700 10716 bytes
SHA-256: 730639aff0d470836d74d27846865760ced1a738addd3de7838e55ee6a4804c0