Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ebbe9b1d6cc5441a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

68.9 KB Created: 2021-01-05 03:12:18 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-18
MD5: cb5080f331a402c474bd8069cead8c1a SHA-1: 0bc0441b051ae54eb26b08c591d72708b7e6e73b SHA-256: ebbe9b1d6cc5441af9b29932ac9a6d436379bbee1dfbe7c3cbd0ccddd6e2c01d
184 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous embedded URLs, with a critical heuristic firing indicating redirection to known malicious infrastructure. The ML classifier also strongly flagged this PDF as malicious. While no scripts were extracted, the presence of multiple links to potentially malicious domains suggests an attempt to phish or redirect users to malware-hosting sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/aws?utm_term=define+foreword+report In PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/gugapedulob/rvghgjI/paranormal_files_the_hook_man_legend_walkthrough.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nixovutak.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406963/dunetukew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jakedekokobara.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381480/jasamejug-jenutuzudemeluf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4419191/normal_5fa2a6f2de5e9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pukotegifo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874060/mujejorawenu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://putigazabikikim.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132682718/pevatupesa_faxurorelotarom_segemevixuvaxe_sudefigi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4403806/normal_5fe27a4579594.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/jumupebuvi/aiIxhgo/keridofenezidejosowulitaz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/nijudow/kolegirasigupubolopara.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tuxenipup/notesejurab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/682c544f-8236-421c-9adc-dde70d33fba7/vireseg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xezonijida/ssc_mts_answer_key_2019_sarkari_exam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d1a3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD1A3 4704 bytes
SHA-256: ee5e80b3b859e6c1e9f700c674899846857b9ad7e093805fb69a28b7d98e83f9
font_01_sfnt_off0000e1cd.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE1CD 10936 bytes
SHA-256: f96d3c7f9a0a50dc45e82b8191cef1ca0a79d650aafb36aa6ecb1664e8dc2f30

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