Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ebb96efcaad18da7…

MALICIOUS

PDF

39.3 KB Created: 2020-10-29 20:06:47 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-05
MD5: 0c56a8ee3f37871c5f99e5bd9a106a52 SHA-1: bfdfb3edcb5a3db2b3f882c6a13729fe1e3abbc0 SHA-256: ebb96efcaad18da7417fdbc32bb8759978a9dde2c6782219322756ea3637dce9
194 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains embedded links to known malicious redirector infrastructure and a link farm, indicating an attempt to direct users to harmful sites. The heuristic 'SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE' suggests the document may also instruct users to execute commands, further increasing the risk. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the presence of numerous embedded URLs and the ML classification strongly suggest malicious intent, likely for phishing or malware delivery.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/123?keyword=kitchenaid+ice+cream+maker+manual In PDF document text
    • https://nezumise.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134265586/gejelozurajewub-jijir-pabinevozos-wunop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4387704/normal_5f90118c9da3a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wibugosavuzatug.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134349607/jememixujuxita.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4387232/normal_5f8d6773dc56d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4381291/normal_5f91f7427c64b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4383795/normal_5f8d66759cb2b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nunezexivu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134440215/gaxuzafubofut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4367311/normal_5f87c1b9c232a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nogegonimever.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134340032/mumakimoperelugo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/retobifulipo/temp_root_apk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/bokexizometun/pifokijazumedazop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xovajukoxin/vocabulary_accounting_and_finance.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/susopuzupure/kiwabetosojedire.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/lorifumofelu/analog_and_digital_signals.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00004e95.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4E95 4808 bytes
SHA-256: 2e5647c8c8c8ea40c102d5e999e5d0f778ababb62adc417ace1a62cac16953fb
font_01_sfnt_off00005ea3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5EA3 10460 bytes
SHA-256: 4585ce58fbc0309d4ec8429bac1f0780df95909aa4100ff15600c6506d2f5e4a
font_02_sfnt_off00008239.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8239 4324 bytes
SHA-256: ff5f0ef16caf3e97cd1984b3a03ea88e11eab8cf63d2ee006085a4b9995833f3

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