Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 eba7e6a0ab00b1eb…

MALICIOUS

PDF

47.1 KB Created: 2020-09-15 07:15:41 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: 8b9580a185328a71d438eb75acd57d12 SHA-1: d8f635926475417b7500ce941e19640e5971e162 SHA-256: eba7e6a0ab00b1eb91954587cfe6461569ec9057854e7b064a869a926e09f0d6
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF document contains a large number of embedded links pointing to various domains, indicating a link farm designed to redirect users to potentially malicious content. The primary heuristic firings confirm the presence of malicious redirector links and a link farm hosted on disposable infrastructure. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.club/pify?keyword=the+art+of+closing+the+deal+pdf In PDF document text
    • http://riwilopaj.perrychapel.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131382028/motulapefad-wukopudob-nulopuwolaza.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mabod.cityreachswissvale.org/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437502/8650411.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.angevinempire.org/uploads/1/3/1/8/131860938/zotefojejokib_pejajevibe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vujekux.generationjobless.eu/uploads/1/3/1/0/131071164/kipulezaso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://modub.roaringgoodphotography.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856160/lezazo_zupof_posuvifu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.a-spacegallery.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438268/8558802.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fuwex.lifesparkz.net/uploads/1/3/1/4/131452883/043a23d5346440c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.theparishcup.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814393/c7003e4b79223.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/756799_a4ec711c1ee24e54ac3161d115068630.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/4f92c1_672b907cd86c484db5e0e04ae90fe699.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b48b60_d603752c1f284a4889c4611df466bdc5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/f68081_c0e1e8b00ec54339abb9bf189c74b699.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/41f880_376383abd9ea40439631c182402298bf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/0d002d_65530363878d4bb6ac513c1a05ad2a19.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006d51.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6D51 5156 bytes
SHA-256: 1432888886a6b872977437fc447742228675c7a1c669c13bd73d701c1f075532
font_01_sfnt_off00007ed0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7ED0 10168 bytes
SHA-256: bb8634034501f7b7e2afc7e299e9aacd97980798a3d1413aac753b3151171be9
font_02_sfnt_off0000a19c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA19C 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 4fcfa7c68d76e23b667942a3ac892d2d5d88346478daafc61479ad4df4af3dd3

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