Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 eba2b1c7a245a57c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

86.7 KB Created: 2021-09-05 12:47:04 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: bc731155bf2419e0a9802c86f5d58873 SHA-1: adfa7e041fac5dab0d8b6d3c4e9391ebe5ad4cea SHA-256: eba2b1c7a245a57c79f0603c0f7015e80af09b5b9b29d64cf81e6417c3f01820
176 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains numerous links pointing to compromised CMS uploads, indicating it's designed as a link farm. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely for phishing or distributing further malware. The document body is unreadable, but the heuristics and URLs confirm its role as a lure to external, potentially malicious, sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9912

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://mfplus.ba/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b6d8f86cf9a---92967261746.pdf
    • http://maginsaatmetal.com/resimlerfiles/10409415907.pdf
    • https://www.chauffeur-prive-nice.fr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160dafeecdbddc---wotorinelusodi.pdf
    • http://4bzsoftware.com/Images_upload/files/bakatagikoso.pdf
    • http://www.grundys.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160e576f4735a9---wasanemizagikusiraxetow.pdf
    • http://www.fliesen-brill.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608124e4a1aab---14910354813.pdf
    • https://contabil-fiscal.ro/mm/file/togibaz.pdf
    • http://alternativefitness.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609668367d624---56810447155.pdf
    • http://amtusa.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608ce259ea4ff---kigozozijav.pdf
    • http://kmsenior.org/file/files/37987082730.pdf
    • https://sesconbs.org.br/ckfinder/userfiles/files/26837361131.pdf
    • http://brnc85.com/clients/878796/File/39262518571.pdf
    • http://geometracosentino.com/userfiles/files/dedojapunotitopoxixawiged.pdf
    • http://veiligheidsslot.nl/ckfinder/userfiles/files/67421434714.pdf
    • https://dtcprojects.com.au/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ehqktm1u72u2vmflna5ojc0449/pibeseduwuforofedodo.pdf
    • https://dungcuruamui.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/dhb0s1dnnag20qsm1crj17l4do/lotiputujetefedipi.pdf
    • https://777mto.org/contents//files/ganoja.pdf
    • http://onsijsselstein.nl/userfiles/files/60797281278.pdf
    • https://nic-irq.com/userfiles/files/25672660370.pdf
    • http://terwaarde.be/ckfinder/userfiles/files/pobotenabotexivodowa.pdf
    • https://www.hdontheroadnapoli.it/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16084622e542ae---kupagefapufeburad.pdf
    • https://www.vedaaz.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0p9feje5fcqf2nh810lvajeal3/11102360966.pdf
    • http://inlikeflintlogistics.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ae52161578f---fatowolaxo.pdf
    • https://murten-hotel.ch/userfiles/files/76039758709.pdf
    • http://xn----8sbnbd9chja.xn--p1ai/userfiles/file/26794556452.pdf
    • https://www.arc-welding.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/qt8cvpmvlf0g9159d4dvkfv4q5/40128274593.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/DOqCt-cVA4I/uplcv?utm_term=mirascreen+g2-4+manual
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ee36.bin
d9f1b253c6760efd779cb351e425f00a1616ced2524f544dc7d26e98733369c1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEE36 18104 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00011c8a.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11C8A 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000134a1.bin
eb75e786015475c9c651de2423a5f9813a93d227d15f71e81d6892a93f732bfa
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x134A1 10680 bytes