Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 eb9bd0a2854618c0…

MALICIOUS

PDF

99.8 KB
MD5: febcf356f2964c2df5daf875a517c9bf SHA-1: 36bcfb83e1092a873e3ab4962f16469bd1a18614 SHA-256: eb9bd0a2854618c0890ce092647b136072233b7aaa6679a65c02744863ad4a87
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: Malicious PDF T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The PDF file exploits CVE-2010-0188, a vulnerability in Adobe Reader related to XFA forms. This exploit likely allows for the execution of arbitrary code, potentially downloading and running a second-stage payload. The embedded file and script payload markers further indicate malicious intent. No specific family could be identified, but the attack pattern is consistent with PDF-based exploit delivery.

Heuristics 5

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
be38bd47f752281f2ea8b0541b5a6b2acc03291287735b7035be992582a89264
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 101496 bytes