Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 eb24309d144a2e99…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

20.0 KB Created: 1993-09-28 15:08:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word for Windows 95 First seen: 2012-06-14
MD5: 4539613fa44211468e913844461ff2ef SHA-1: 8035c0c50b30bc1d438b0a920e699c8c7a59db4a SHA-256: eb24309d144a2e99e7ec92563b4946c9ae49f5e0b63b8a265fa964ed89450fce
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The presence of a legacy WordBasic AutoOpen macro (AutoExec) and embedded OLE objects with suspicious findings strongly suggests malicious intent. ClamAV detections of 'Win.Trojan.Era-2' on both the main file and an extracted artifact confirm its malicious nature. The document body content appears to be unrelated boilerplate text, likely used to obscure the malicious functionality.

Heuristics 4

  • ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Era-2 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Trojan.Era-2
  • Embedded Office document has suspicious static findings critical EMBEDDED_OFFICE_CHILD_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A CFB/OLE Office document was found inside another file type and its carved contents matched Office exploit or payload heuristics. This catches wrapped exploit documents where the top-level file routes to a PE, archive, or generic scanner instead of Office.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • CFB header with no readable streams medium OLE_PARSE_EMPTY_STREAMS
    The file begins with a valid OLE2/CFB header but exposes no directory streams. A non-empty compound document with an unreadable directory is anomalous — it is seen with truncated/corrupt files and, more importantly, with content deliberately shifted off byte boundaries to defeat parsers while the host application still recovers the object.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_office_off00002100.ole embedded-office Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0x2100 12032 bytes
SHA-256: 3f5a536eaa1ff9193d8c2b3c28e397e9ca4e713374660f0096a3b0757134fdb7
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Era-2
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely